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Sentience in all organisms with centralized nervous systems
Commentary on Mikhalevich & Powell on Invertebrate Minds
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Abstract: Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue for considering the welfare of invertebrates,
especially insects, by asking whether invertebrates have the cognitive and neural characteristics
necessary for sentience. This approach assumes that human neural and cognitive complexity is the
basis of sentience. But insight might also be gained by turning this approach on its head and
examining the notion that sentience may be a fundamental biological property, appearing very
early in the evolution of life in all organisms with centralized nervous systems.
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Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) are to be commended for bringing the long-neglected issue
of invertebrate ethics to the forefront in an incisive and well-researched target article. As they
point out, although increasing attention is being paid to ethics concerning some invertebrate
groups (such as cephalopods; Jacquet et al., 2019; Mather, 2019; King & Marino, 2019), others,
such as insects, are typically denied consideration despite comparable evidence for sentience.
M&P make the case for extending welfare protection to invertebrates, especially insects. They
focus on a variety of variables such as brain complexity, cognitive capacity, and sentience.
The “down from humans” approach. We typically view sentience (“something it is like to be”)
(Nagel, 1974) as a property of human brains and then we inquire what other species have it. M&P
point out that this approach is problematic because it takes the human species as the gold
standard for a phenomenon we do not yet understand. They note that it is difficult to identify the
“neuro-computational threshold(s)” that divide those species with the ability to suffer — who
hence deserve moral consideration — from those who do not. Although M&P consider that the
requisite qualities for moral consideration may be a matter of degree rather than all-or-none,
their analysis takes the usual downward trajectory on the scala naturae, asking how “low” we can
go and still find species with cognitive features we consider important for moral consideration.
M&P dismiss homology-based strategies for extending recognition to invertebrates,
pointing out that invertebrate brains evolved largely “independently from vertebrates,”
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considering the evolutionary distance of the last ancestor between them: “homologies at lower
levels, such as cell type and signaling molecules … do not have any straightforward implications
for sentience or cognitive sophistication.” But what if we have it upside down? What if sentience
is the most basic feature of all organisms with central nervous systems? If sentience appeared
very early in the evolution of nervous systems, then all brains are simply different versions of the
same basic process. In that case, the complexities we recognize in mammalian, primate, and
human cognition are not what afforded the ability to feel and therefore have welfare.
To be clear, I am not making an argument for the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC)
(Reber, 2016) or panpsychism (Goff, 2017). While there are many basic elements of information
processing in single cells that appear to have been co-opted during the evolution of multicellular
animals, there are also many important empirical criteria that have not yet been met for
acceptance of either notion. However, staying within an empirically sound and materialist
framework, the recognition of neural, functional, and evolutionary continuity may also indicate
shared cognition and sentience across a much greater range of organisms.
Evidence for the primacy of sentience. Several authors have suggested, based on both homology
and analogy, that continuity at the neurophysiological level reflects continuity at higher levels of
brain organization. Basic processes associated with neural transmission may set the stage for
sentience without entailing that all organisms or all objects are sentient (Braun, 2015; Klein &
Baron, 2016; Marino, 2015).
Cook, Carvalho, & Damasio (2014), for example, reason that electrostatic changes
associated with neuronal action potentials underlie “sentience” at the cellular level and that the
coordination of these processes may have led to the emergence of organism-level awareness or
sentience. They do not make any claims about subjective experience in single-celled organisms,
noting only the continuity in neurophysiological mechanisms and function (to maintain
homeostasis) shared among protozoans and metazoans.
Lane (2009) has also noted that “consciousness, at bottom, is about life and death, and
not about the wonderful pinnacles of the human mind” (p. 259). In other words, sentience may
be primal; more complex vertebrate brain structures may simply change the content or increase
the range of features in the world we are aware of, but they are not necessary for basic subjective
experience.
Tononi & Koch (2015) have formulated a model called Integrated Information Theory (ITT),
according to which consciousness is a fundamental property of all systems that have certain
cause-and-effect features. They argue that consciousness is graded and can be found in the
simplest of organisms as long as they have these features. They do not imply that conscious
experience is equivalent across organisms but only that possessing consciousness – or sentience,
if you will — can be a property of even very small brains.
Are invertebrate and vertebrate brains really all that different? M&P suggest that invertebrate
and vertebrate brains are so disparate that comparisons are not useful. But how different are the
brains of arthropods and vertebrates? Bilaterians emerged in the fossil record about 550 to 600
million years ago as early wormlike creatures with a nerve cord running down their body and
enlarged ganglia (early brain) at the head region. This process is called cephalization; an anterior
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brain connected to a nerve cord became the Bauplan of the nervous system thereafter for all
organisms with a central nervous system (Arendt et al., 2008; Striedter, 2005).
Both invertebrate and vertebrate brains rely on the same basic principles of information
processing. All of the major vertebrate neurotransmitters, which are ultimately derived from
single amino acids, are also found in invertebrate brains (Messenger, 1996), and most of them
also served as signaling molecules before the first central nervous system evolved (Turlejski,
1996). Moreover, embryonic development of nervous systems across species reveals a highly
conserved plan (Striedter, 2005). Others have pointed out that there are key functional similarities
between insect and vertebrate brains (Klein & Baron, 2016). Strausfeld & Hirth (2013), for
example, have argued for a deep homology — not just analogy — between some insect and
vertebrate brain structures.
Conclusion. If sentience is a fundamental property of all organisms with brains, then vertebrate
and mammalian brain structures are not the critical ones for sentience, hence ethical
consideration. It exceeds the scope of a commentary to review and evaluate the evidence for this
hypothesis, but it would be important to subject it to rigorous empirical examination.
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